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This overview comments upon eleven administrative law
cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during its 1976-1977 term.
Several of these cases represent new departures by the court.
In Rutherford v. United States, I the Tenth Circuit set clear
standards for the FDA and the district courts in determining
whether a drug (here, Laetrile) is exempted from the "new drug"
certification procedures of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.' In
the areas of exhaustion of administrative remedies and res judi-
cata, the court used relatively recent United States Supreme
Court decisions to clarify Tenth Circuit policies.'
In Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc. v. Butz,' a case of first im-
pression, the Tenth Circuit held that feedlots are not "livestock
dealers" and thus are not subject to the registration and bonding
provisions of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921.1 In EEOC
v. Continental Oil Co.,' the Tenth Circuit decided that if an
individual has brought suit under Title VII for employment dis-
crimination, the EEOC is limited to participating in the litigation
by intervening in the private suit. In a Federal Tort Claims Act
case, the Tenth Circuit, for the first time, held it proper to con-
sider the effect of inflation upon future earnings!
These decisions indicate a somewhat more progressive court
than in the past. Compared to its prior three terms,8 the Tenth
542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
See text accompanying notes 9-29 infra.
See text accompanying notes 43-59 infra.
557 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1977).
See text accompanying notes 60-68 infra.
548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977).
' See text accompanying notes 116-125 infra.
9 See Overview (Third Annual Tenth Circuit Survey), Administrative Law, 54 DEN.
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Circuit has become far more willing to formulate new policy in
the field of administrative law.
I. JURISDICTION, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, AND SCOPE OF
REVIEW
A. Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976)
In Rutherford v. United States' the Tenth Circuit reviewed
a district court order enjoining the FDA from preventing appellee
Rutherford from obtaining a supply of the controversial cancer
drug Laetrile for his own use. The court upheld the preliminary
injunction on the ground that the issue of whether Laetrile is a
"new drug," so as to bring it within the certification procedures
of section 505(a) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act10 (the Act),
is a mixed question of law and fact which should be fully tried.
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the district court."
The FDA contended that its administrative determination
that Laetrile was a "new drug" barred the drug's introduction
into interstate commerce without an approved new drug applica-
tion (NDA) having been filed pursuant to the Act. l2 Rutherford
asserted that even if Laetrile is a drug, it is not a new drug and
hence is exempt from the NDA provisions of the Act."3
The Tenth Circuit commenced its analysis of the question of
whether Laetrile is a new drug by examining section 201(p) of the
Act," deciding that "[ilhe effect of [the statutory definition of
L.J. 7 (1977); Overview (Second Annual Tenth Circuit Survey), Administrative Law, 53
DEN. L.J. 29 (1976); Overview (First Annual Tenth Circuit Survey), Administrative Law
and Procedure, 52 DEN. L.J. 39 (1975).
542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
tO 21 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq. (1970).
542 F.2d at 1140, 1144.
" 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1970) provides: "No person shall introduce or deliver for intro-
duction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is effective with respect to such drug." The
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare is required by this section to review the
application within a specified period on the criteria of safety and effectiveness as demon-
strated by "adequate and well-controlled investigations." Such an application is review-
able directly in the court of appeals. 542 F.2d at 1140.
I d.
, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1970) provides:
The term "new drug" means-
(1) Any drug (except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing or
containing a new animal drug) the composition of which is such that such
drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific train-
VOL. 55
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the term 'new drug'] is that there is a two-fold grandfather clause
exemption which is capable of removing Laetrile from the new
drug category even if it is not recognized by the experts as being
safe and effective . . . ." The first grandfather exemption, the
court said, derives from transitional provisions attached to the
1962 amendment to the Act, whereas the second grandfather ex-
emption arises from provisions attached to the 1938 Act when it
superseded the original Food and Drug Act of 1906.16
Considering the first exemption, the court noted that prior
to the 1962 amendment the only prerequisite for a drug to avoid
classification as a new drug was recognition by qualified experts
that it was safe, but that the 1962 amendment added the require-
ment of "effectiveness."' 7 However, the effect of the amendment's
transitional provisions, 1" according to the court, was that if Lae-
trile was marketed before October 10, 1962 for "exactly the same
uses for which it is presently being sold and was generally recog-
nized by qualified experts as safe for those uses, it is exempt...
from the test of general recognition by experts as being both safe
and effective for its claimed uses."'" The court then directed that
the questions of whether Laetrile was marketed as a cancer drug
ing and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe
and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the labeling thereof, except that such a drug not so recognized shall
not be deemed to be a "new drug" if at any time prior to enactment of this
chapter it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, as
amended, and if at such time its labeling contained the same representations
concerning the conditions of its use; or
(2) Any drug (except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing or
containing a new animal drug) the composition of which is such that such
drug, as a result of investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness
for use under such conditions, has become so recognized, but which has not,
otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a material extent or for
a material time under such conditions.
IS 542 F.2d at 1141.
I Id.
'7 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)(1), 76 Stat. 781 (1962)).
" Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 107(c)(4), 76 Stat. 781 (1962), reprinted at 21 U.S.C. § 321
note.
" 542 F.2d at 1141 (citing Tyler Pharmacal Distributors, Inc. v. United States Dep't
of HEW, 408 F.2d 95, 99 (7th Cir. 1969). The Tenth Circuit also cited its own decision in
United States v. Allan Drug Corp., 357 F.2d 713, 717 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
899 (1966) where it had previously construed the 1938 Act's definition of a "new drug,"
the 1962 amendment to the Act, and the so-called "grandfather clause." The Tyler opinion
relied heavily on Allan.
1978
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on October 9, 1962 and whether it was then generally recognized
as safe be considered by the FDA on remand by the district
court.
The Tenth Circuit next considered the second grandfather
exemption"t and concluded that "a drug may escape the 'new
drug' machinery if it was marketed or officially recognized as a
drug at any time before June 25, 1938, but after June 30, 1906."l
The court accordingly framed the issue for future proceedings as
whether or not Laetrile was "recognized or used as a cancer drug
under the same conditions of present use during the period when
the Food and Drug Act of 1906 was in effect, June 30, 1906 to June
25, 1938."23 If so, the court said, Laetrile would be exempt from
the "new drug" procedures of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.2
The Tenth Circuit considered the question, as to whether
Laetrile was exempted from the new drug procedures by virtue
of either of the foregoing grandfather clauses, to be "substantial,
difficult and doubtful," thus supporting the grant of a prelimi-
nary injunction. 5
The court went on to examine the adequacy of the record to
support the FDA's initial determination that Laetrile is a new
drug. It appeared "doubtful" to the court that the FDA had in
fact developed an adequate record for court review, for to support
its determination the FDA would have to present "substantial
evidence . . . that Laetrile is not generally recognized among
qualified experts as 'safe and effective,' and that Laetrile is not
grandfathered by either of the exemptions discussed above.""
Therefore, conforming to the procedure established by the Su-
542 F.2d at 1141, 1143.
" This exemption derives from the transitional provisions of the 1938 Act which
provide that a drug not recognized by qualified experts as "safe and effective"
shall not be deemed to be a "new drug" if at any time prior to the enact-
ment of this chapter (the 1938 Act) it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act
of June 30, 1906, as amended, and if at such time its labeling contained the
same representations concerning the conditions of its use.
542 F.2d at 1141-1142 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1970)). The court noted that all
substances which were recognized or used as drugs at the time of passage of the 1906 Act
were subject to its wide coverage. 542 F.2d at 1141-42.
n 542 F.2d at 1142.
2 Id.
4 Id.
" Id. at 1142-43.
" Id. at 1143.
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preme Court in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 the
Tenth Circuit ordered the district court to remand the case to the
FDA for proceedings adequate to develop a record supportive of
the agency's determination, wherein Laetrile proponents would
have an opportunity to express their views. 2
The Tenth Circuit, applying Bentex, has thus left to the
FDA's sole determination the question of whether a drug such as
Laetrile is a "new drug" and hence subject to the certification
provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938. However,
the Tenth Circuit has also forcefully reminded the FDA that it
cannot answer this question by administrative fiat,2 and the
court has also established clear standards for use by the FDA and
the courts in determining whether a drug is exempted from the
"new drug" procedures of the Act by one or both of its grand-
father provisions.
B. Public Service Co. v. FPC, 557 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1977)
In Public Service Co. v. FPC and its companion case, City
of Gallup v. FPC,30 the Tenth Circuit reviewed two Federal Power
Commission orders concerning a rate increase sought by Public
Service Company of New Mexico (Public Service) for electricity
sold to the City of Gallup.
In the first case, Public Service contended that the Commis-
sion erred in holding that its contract with Gallup barred Public
Service's unilateral rate increase filing.3' The Tenth Circuit noted
412 U.S. 645 (1973). In Bentex the Supreme Court stated: "We conclude that the
District Court's referral of the 'new drug' and the 'grandfather' issues to FDA was appro-
priate, as these are the kinds of issues peculiarly suited to initial determination by the
FDA." Id. at 653.
* 542 F.2d at 1143.
* The court stated that "the FDA's record is grossly inadequate and consists merely
of a conclusory affidavit of an official of the FDA which in effect declares that [Laetrile]
is a new drug because the FDA says it is . Id. at 1140.
557 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1977).
" Public Service sells electric power to Gallup under a contract requiring payment
at a monthly rate, with provisions for fuel cost and tax adjustments. Articles II and XII
of the contract included other provisions which were central to this controversy. Article II
contained a paragraph entitled "Change in Rate" which included an option for Gallup to
terminate the agreement within 90 days after being given notice of a rate increase "should
the rates charged herein to the Consumer by the Company be increased for any reason
whatsoever other than fuel cost or tax adjustments. ... Article XII stated that the
contract, including the tariff made a part thereof, was subject to "such changes or modifi-
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that its primary guidelines were furnished by the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in a trilogy of electric utility cases3
which were summarized in Richmond Power & Light v. FPC3 as
follows: "The rule of Sierra, Mobile and Memphis is refreshingly
simple: The contract between the parties governs the legality of
the filing. Rate filings consistent with contractual obligations are
valid; rate filings inconsistent with contractual obligations are
invalid. ' 34 The court examined and rejected each of Public Serv-
ice's arguments in support of its claim of a right under the con-
tract to make unilateral rate filings. The court in effect concluded
that the rate filings were inconsistent with Public Service's con-
tractual obligations, stating that had the parties intended Public
Service to have the important right to file unilateral rate in-
creases, the right would have been clearly provided for in the
contract rather than being left to implication.3 5
In the Gallup case, the City challenged an FPC order insti-
tuting proceedings to determine a just and reasonable rate for
Public Service pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act.3"
The challenged portion of the Commission's order stated that the
proceeding "would not entail meeting the heavy burden of proof
associated with the Mobile-Sierra decisions." 7 On appeal, the
cations as shall be ordered from time to time by any legally constituted regulatory body
having jurisdiction to require such changes or modifications." Id. at 228.
" United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103
(1958); FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
481 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973).
, Id. at 493.
' 557 F.2d at 232. There was no language in the contract from which the court could
reasonably imply a unilateral right to increase rates. The contract provisions at issue in
this case are easily distinguishable from those considered in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958), which the Supreme Court found
to permit a unilateral rate increase by the power company. The agreements provided that
"[aill gas delivered hereunder shall be paid for by Buyer under Seller's Rate Schedule
.. .or any effective superseding rate schedules, on file with the Federal Power Commis-
sion." Id. at 105 (emphasis by the Court). The Court held that rather than seeking
unilaterally to abrogate its contractual undertaking, the seller in Memphis sought "simply
to assert, in accordance with the procedures specified by the Act, rights expressly reserved
to it by contract." Id. at 112. The Court therefore concluded that the seller could, consis-
tent with its contractual undertaking, unilaterally increase its rate by filing a new tariff
with the Commission.
38 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1970).




Commission asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction over Gal-
lup's petition for review because Gallup was not presently
"aggrieved" within the meaning of section 313(b) of the Federal
Power Act,35 there having been no change in the rates which Gal-
lup was required to pay.39 The Commission contended that the
earliest possible point at which Gallup would have standing was
at the conclusion of the Commission's section 206 proceeding and
that therefore Gallup's petition was premature.40 The Tenth Cir-
cuit agreed that the Commission's orders with respect to Gallup
were preliminary and procedural and that Gallup could not suffer
any real injury unless the rates were modified by the Commisson
in the section 206 proceeding.4 The court accordingly dismissed
Gallup's petition without prejudice, rejecting Gallup's further
claim that the ongoing section 206 proceeding could be a
"nullity" if the wrong burden of proof were used.42
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: McGrath v.
Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976)
In McGrath v. Weinberger,43 the Tenth Circuit, citing two
exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doc-
trine, accepted jurisdiction over a due process constitutional
challenge of certain Social Security Administration procedures."
In Sierra, the Court held that although a contract for a fixed term at a fixed
rate was involved so that a unilateral filing could not effect a change in rate,
under the Federal Power Act the Commission could have a hearing to deter-
mine "whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest-as
where it might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue
its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly
discriminatory."
Id. (citing 350 U.S. at 355).
P 16 U.S.C. § 825e(b) (1970), which provides in part: "Any party to a proceeding
under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding
may obtain a review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals.
" 557 F.2d at 232.
Id.
" Id. at 233.
12 Id. (citing Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 370 F.2d 777, 781 (10th Cir. 1967)).
,3 541 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977).
" The court upheld the constitutionality of procedures authorizing the appointment,
without prior notice or opportunity to contest by the recipient, of a representative payee
to manage the monetary benefits of the recipient determined incapable of so doing. 541
F.2d at 254 (construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, 1381 (1970)).
The court noted the Social Security Administration subsequently modified its proce-
dures: "A ten-day advance notice of a proposed payee action is now sent to all legally
competent beneficiaries and court appointed guardians." 541 F.2d at 251 n.3.
1978
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Acting upon information provided by state mental hospital per-
sonnel, a local Social Security office determined McGrath incap-
able of managing his benefits and appointed a representative
payee. The procedures provided for a post-deprivation hearing
but not a pre-deprivation hearing. McGrath sought judicial re-
view without exhausting his administrative remedies and the
government interposed a jurisdictional challenge. 5 The Tenth
Circuit held that jurisdiction existed, noting two exceptions to
the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.6
The first exception addressed the distinction between the
power of an administrative agency to determine the constitu-
tional applicability of legislation and its lack of power to deter-
mine the constitutionality of legislation.4 7 The second exception
involved the presence of constitutional questions, coupled both
with a demonstration of the inadequacy of prescribed administra-
tive remedies and with either a threat or impending irreparable
injury flowing from the delay incident to pursuing prescribed
administrative procedures. 4
The Tenth Circuit cited Mathews v. Eldridge" as control-
ling. 0 It stated the decision's essence as being that statutorily
created finality requirements should not be construed to cause
crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable
injuries to be suffered.5' The significance of McGrath lies in the
" 541 F.2d at 251, 253-54.
" Id. at 251-53. See Ryan v. Shea, 525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
, 541 F.2d at 251 (citing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, § 20.04 (1958)). See also K.
DAVIS, ADhNISTArIvE LAW ov THE SEVENrES, §§ 20.01, 20.04 (1976 & Supp. 1977 §§ 20.00
to 20.00-3), where Professor Davis indicates that the exhaustion doctrine recently has been
subjected to radical alteration by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
,3 Id. at 251-52 (citing Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964) and City of
Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958)).
,' 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Eldridge asserted that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment required the Social Security Administration to provide him with notice and
an opportunity for a hearing prior to terminating his disability benefits. Professor Kenneth
Davis is quite upset with the import of Eldridge. See note 47 supra.
10 The Tenth Circuit relied upon Eldridge in disposing of the constitutional challenge.
541 F.2d at 253-54. Eldridge provided a test mandating consideration of three interests:
(1) The private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of the interest through the procedures utilized, and the probable value of any additional,
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest, including the func-
tion of, and the fiscal and administrative burdens imposed by, additional or substitute
procedural requirements. Id. at 253 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
1, 541 F.2d at 252.
VOL. 55
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Tenth Circuit's refusal to permit the exhaustion-of-
administrative-remedies doctrine to function as an absolute juris-
dictional bar for considering a collateral constitutional due pro-
cess challenge.
D. Res Judicata-Cooper v. United States, 546 F.2d 870 (10th
Cir. 1976).
In Cooper v. United States,"2 the Tenth Circuit, implement-
ing a test enunciated in United States v. Utah Construction Co.,
53
held that res judicata principles applied to administrative pro-
ceedings when: (1) The agency acted in a judicial capacity; (2) it
resolved a factual dispute properly before it; and (3) the parties
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the factual dispute at
an evidentiary hearing."
Cooper arose from the denial in 1969, based upon character
or behavior disorders, of an airman's medical certificate.15 After
an evidentiary hearing, a hearing examiner sustained the denial
and, in turn, the National Transportation Safety Board upheld
his action. Cooper did not seek judicial review but rather, he
applied again in 1974 for the medical certificate. The Chief Ad-
ministrative Law Judge refused a hearing, noting the issues were
the same as those in the prior hearing, and denied the applica-
tion. In 1975 the National Transportation Safety Board upheld
that decision, stating that res judicata barred reconsideration of
the 1972 decision. Cooper petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review,
asserting that the National Transportation Safety Board's action
in granting review precluded it from using res judicata. The court
affirmed the National Transportation Safety Board decision. 7
In recognizing the propriety of res judicata, the Tenth Circuit
utilized the Utah Construction Co. test to clarify its prior decision
in Hobby v. Hodges.5" In Hobby the court conceded the lack of a
' 546 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1976).
384 U.S. 394 (1966).
', Id. at 422; 546 F.2d at 871-72.
The court noted its jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1976). The airman's
medical certificate is a prerequisite for obtaining or retaining either a private or commer-
cial pilot's license. 546 F.2d at 870. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(c) (1977).
" 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970) permitted Cooper to seek judicial review. 546 F.2d at
871.
" 546 F.2d at 870-72.
-, 215 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1954).
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clear rule specifying when the findings and decision of an admin-
istrative body are res judicata for subsequent proceedings. The
Tenth Circuit, in that decision, held the application of the doc-
trine appropriate where permitting the applicant to relitigate a
claim after his failure to seek judicial review would run counter
to the purposes and provisions of the Social Security Act. 9
The significance of Cooper lies in its enunciation of the test
specifying when res judicata principles apply in administrative
proceedings.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc. v. Butz, 557 F.2d 717 (10th Cir.
1977)
In 1973 the Department of Agriculture reversed its prior posi-
tion that custom feedlots were not livestock dealers within the
definition of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921'0 and sought
to bring Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc. under those provisions of
the Act which require all dealers and market agencies to register
with the Secretary of Agriculture (the Secretary) and to post
bonds."' In Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc. v. Butz, 2 a case of first
impression, the Tenth Circuit, affirming a declaratory judgment
of the district court, held that the plaintiff feedlot and other
feedlots of similar character were not livestock dealers within the
definition of the Act.
The Secretary's primary contention on appeal was that Solo-
mon was indeed a livestock dealer because it assisted its custom-
ers with the purchase of livestock which were then placed at the
Solomon Feedlot for feeding until they reached the desired weight
for slaughter, after which Solomon aided in the sale of the cattle
to packer-buyers. The Secretary asserted that Solomon was thus
engaged in the business of buying and selling livestock as the
I d. at 759. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
4 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1970). Section 201(c) of the Act provides that "[tihe term
'market agency' means any person engaged in the business of (1) buying or selling in
commerce livestock on a commission basis or (2) furnishing stockyard services .... "
Section 201(d) provides that "[tihe term 'dealer' means any person, not a market agency,
engaged in the business of buying or selling in commerce livestock, either on his own
account or as the employee or agent of the vendor or purchaser."
1 7 U.S.C. §§ 203, 204 (1970); 9 C.F.R. §§ 201.10, 201.27(c), 201.29.
,2 557 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1977).
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employee or agent of the vendor or purchaser and hence subject
to the provisions of the Act.
3
The Tenth Circuit stated that the purpose of the Act is to
protect producers and consumers, and that among the means
prescribed to accomplish this purpose was the posting of bonds."4
It noted that packers were subjected to the bonding requirement
by a 1976 amendment to the Act,65 primarily resulting from the
large number of packer failures which had left livestock producers
unpaid for over $43 million worth of livestock." The court de-
clared that Congress was aware of the "enhanced role of feedlots"
and "if it had seen the need for including feedlots within the
sweep of the Act, it could have done so on the occasion of its
expanding the regulation of packinghouses." 7 Observing that
feedlot operators such as Solomon do not handle the proceeds of
cattle sales, the court concluded that Congress did not intend
them to be subjected to the requirements of the Packers and
Stockyards Act. 8
Id. at 718-19.
' Id. at 720.
Pub. L. No. 94-410, § 3(c), 90 Stat. 1249 (1976) (to be codified in 7 U.S.C. §§ 203,
204).
, 557 F.2d at 720 (citing S. REP. No. 94-932, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2267, 2270-71).
" 557 F.2d at 721.
U The court had previously noted that Solomon "handled no money and was not
engaged in any activity specified in Section 201 .... " Id. at 720. This statement
amounted to a finding that Solomon was not the employee or agent of the vendor or
purchaser and thus fell outside the statutory definition. The court also stated that Solo-
mon was not paid any fee in connection with the assistance afforded its customers in
buying and selling livestock. Id. at 719. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit had previously
stated in Kelley v. United States, 202 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1953), a case relied upon by the
Secretary, that the collection or receipt of a commission for the handling of any livestock
for another was "immaterial" to the determination of whether a person was acting as a
dealer within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 841. The court, however, appears to have
correctly distinguished the Kelley case from the present one inasmuch as Kelley, although
not collecting or remitting funds on behalf of buyers or sellers of livestock, was engaged
in purchasing livestock for resale as a speculation and not for purposes of improving their
value through feeding. The Kelley court noted in this connection that speculators who buy
in their own name to resell have traditionally been considered as dealers. Id. In Solomon
the court remarked that one of the Department of Agriculture's own publications had
recognized that speculators in livestock fall within the statutory definition of dealers while
those who make profit as a result of improving the animals do not. 557 F.2d at 720.
1978
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B. Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 551 F.2d 1178
(10th Cir. 1977)
This case disposed of appeals from a judgment enjoining the
defendants, Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) and the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), from proceeding with the sale of the Daniels and Fisher
Tower in Denver, Colorado, to a local architectural firm which
planned to renovate the Tower into office space as part of the
HUD-funded Skyline Urban Renewal Project."5 The district court
found that neither the pertinent section of the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA)70 nor the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)71 applied, but rather that the
HUD-approved regulations" under NHPA activated the proce-
dural requirements set out in NHPA.7 3 DURA and HUD ap-
pealed, and plaintiffs, the State Preservation Officer and the
State Historical Society of Colorado, cross-appealed. The plain-
tiffs contended that "the district court reached the right decision
for the wrong reasons" and urged the circuit court to find that the
two Acts, in addition to the HUD regulations, were applicable.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that NHPA
was inapplicable to the case. The court stated that the Tower sale
did not fall within the statute's relevant provision7" because the
Tower was not placed in the National Register of Historic Places"
11 Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1977).
70 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970).
71 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
72 36 C.F.R. § 800.1 et seq. (1976).
551 F.2d at 1179.
7, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970), cited at 551 F.2d 1178, 1179-80:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a
proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head
of any Federal department or independent agency having authority to license
any undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Fed-
eral funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the
case may be, take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district,
site, building, structure, or object that is included in the National Register.
The head of any such Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation established under sections 470i to 470n of this title a
reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking. (Em-
phasis by the court.)
7" The Register, established by NHPA, "recognizes and preserves objects significant
in American history, architecture, archaelogy, and culture." 551 F.2d at 1179.
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until 1969, whereas the Skyline Urban Renewal Project, of which
the Tower renovation formed a part, was officially approved by
HUD in 1968 when HUD and DURA entered into a project loan
and capital contract. The court concluded that the key element
in the statute is approval, and not actual expenditure, of funds,
citing a similar interpretation in other jurisdictions. 7 Although
the last expenditure of federal funds occurred in 1970 when
DURA purchased the Tower from a private owner, the court
voted that "this is not the 'expenditure' contemplated in the
statute."
77
The Tenth Circuit, although affirming the district court's
findings as to the inapplicability of NHPA to this case, did not
arrive at the same conclusion with respect to the applicability of
NEPA. 78 The Court saw the primary issue as "whether the loan
and capital grant contract's requirement that HUD approve all
acquisitions and dispositions of property by the DURA . . .es-
tablishes major Federal action sufficient to mandate compliance
with the Act each time that approval is given."79 The court an-
swered the question affirmatively, finding too restrictive the dis-
trict court's holding that the loan and capital contract was the
only major federal action involved in the project. 80 The Tenth
Circuit followed the trend established by the First, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits"' by holding that DURA's proposed sale of the
", South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970); St. Joseph Historical Soc'y v. Land Clearance for Redev.
Auth., 366 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Kent County Council for Historic Preserv. v.
Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
" 551 F.2d at 1180. The district court in Kent County Council stated that the "prior
to the approval of expenditure" language in the statute (see text accompanying note 15
supra) does not mean that every time there is to be an expenditure pursuant to a prior
approval the entire approval machinery must again be set in motion and the approval
process repeated. 304 F. Supp. at 888. The court was emphatic in declaring that the words
"prior to approval of the expenditure" do not mean "prior to the expenditure," observing
that "[aipproval of expenditure requires a judgment" whereas "the actual expenditure
is a clerical, ministerial or mechanical act." Id.
,' 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
551 F.2d at 1181.
Id. at 1181-82. The court found support for its conclusion in Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d
885 (1st Cir. 1973); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); and Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n v. Romney,
343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972).
" See Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton,
471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973); and Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323
(4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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Tower was sufficient federal action to require filing of an environ-
mental impact statement, notwithstanding the fact that the loan
and capital grant contract was signed prior to the effective date
of NEPA.2 The judgment of the district court was therefore af-
firmed but upon a slightly different rationale than that asserted
by the lower court.
C. Vissian v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 548 F.2d
325 (10th Cir. 1977)
In Vissian v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,13 peti-
tioner claimed, on appeal from a final deportation order entered
by the Board of Immigration Appeals, that he was wrongfully
precluded from applying to the Attorney General for a discretion-
ary waiver of excludability under section 212(c) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act." Vissian also contended that the Board
of Immigration Appeals erred in concluding that even if he had
been eligible to apply for a waiver, a favorable exercise of discre-
tion would not have been warranted. 5
The Tenth Circuit disposed of Vissian's first contention by
reference to the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Immigration &
Naturalizaton Service v. Bagamastad,6 which upheld the pro-
priety of the Attorney General's pretermission of a ruling on eligi-
bility to apply for discretionary relief in cases where such relief
would not be granted in any event.87 With respect to Vissian's
" 551 F.2d at 1182.
" 548 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1977).
" 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970). This section provides:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily pro-
ceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who
are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile.of seven consecutive years,
may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard
to the provisions of paragraphs (1)-(25), (30), and (31) of subsection (a) of
this section ....
(Subsection (a) specifies 31 classes of aliens to be excluded from admission to the United
States, including aliens convicted of marijuana and narcotics offenses. 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(23) (1970)). Vissian, while on vacation from the United States in 1971, had en-
tered a plea of guilty in a court of Australia, to a charge of importation of cannabis and
cocaine. 548 F.2d at 327.
u 548 F.2d at 327.
" 429 U.S. 24 (1976), rev'g. 531 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1976).
11 Id. at 25. The relief at issue in this case was that set forth in section 245(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1970), which authorizes the Attor-
ney General in his discretion to change the status of an alien who is physically present in
the United States to that of a permanent resident. Id. at 24.
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second contention, the court ruled that the Attorney General (or
his representative) "may not use this pretermission of the eligibil-
ity decision as a guise for pretermitting a hearing on the factual
grounds for exercising his discretion as well. '8 8 The court noted
that Vissian was precluded from presenting evidence in support
of a favorable exercise of discretion and that, although Vissian's
counsel made an offer of proof consisting of eleven letters of rec-
ommendation attesting to Vissian's value to the community, this
isolated and summarily-rejected offer of proof did not satisfy the
requirements of a full and fair hearing comporting with the ac-
cepted principles of due process."9 The court cautioned that its
holding "should not be misconstrued as requiring a separate hear-
ing on the factual basis for the exercise of section 212(c) discre-
tion, but merely a 'hearing within the deportation hearing' al-
ready required by the Act." 0
It therefore appears that although the Attorney General (or
his representative) need not make specific findings with respect
to an applicant's eligibility for discretionary relief where such
relief would not be granted in any event, the Attorney General
must provide a full and fair hearing comporting with the accepted
principles of due process on the issue of whether discretionary
relief is warranted under the facts of each particular case." The
Tenth Circuit in Vissian has clearly announced that this issue is
separate and distinct from the eligibility issue.2
D. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Continental
Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977)
The issue presented by this case93 is the authority of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Com-
mission) to bring a separate civil action under Title VII, section
706(f)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 predicated upon the
" 548 F.2d at 330.
aId.
" Id. The Court cited Zamura v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 534 F.2d 1055,
1060 (2d Cir. 1976) where the Second Circuit stated with respect to a discretionary stay
of deportation that, "as concerns the factfinding process upon which the discretionary
decision in part depends, . . the § 243(h) inquiry constitutes a hearing, albeit a hearing
within [the deportation] hearing."
548 F.2d at 329-30.
' Id. at 330.
EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 & Supp. 1H 1972).
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charges of two individuals, each of whom had previously filed an
action in vindication of his charge of employment discrimination.
Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII sets forth the procedure for filing
suit to redress alleged unlawful employment practices." This pro-
cedure is summarized as follows:
1. A charge must be filed within 180 days after the occurrence
of an alleged unlawful employment practice.
2. If the Commission finds reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true, and conciliation attempts prove unsuccessful, the
Commission may bring suit against the respondent within 180 days
of the filing of the charge. The charging party shall have the right
to intervene in the Commission's suit.
3. If the Commission fails to file an action within 180 days, it
shall notify the charging party.
4. Within 90 days after receipt of notice, the charing party
may bring a civil action against the respondent. Should a private
action be brought, the Commission may intervene, in the discretion
of the court, upon certification that the case is of general public
importance."
Before deciding whether the EEOC could bring suit under
section 706(f)(1) after the charging party had already exercised
his right to sue, the Tenth Circuit examined three differing views
on this point as manifested in decisions of the circuit courts inter-
preting section 706(f)(1). The first view appears in the cases of
EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co.,97 EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 8 and EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co." According to
these cases, if the EEOC suit is broader in scope than the pre-
viously filed private action, the EEOC suit may proceed in vindi-
cation of further similar acts or incidents of discrimination dis-
covered in the process of investigation of the charge which gave
rise to the private action.' ® The Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed
this view, stating that it was unable to find any basis within the
statute for defining the right of the EEOC to sue in terms of the
scope of its suit.'0 '
11 Id. Section 706 in general is addressed to vindication of individual instances of
employment discrimination. 548 F.2d at 887.
" EEOC v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
17 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975).
- 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1975).
" 511 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1975).
110 This was the Tenth Circuit's summary of these cases. EEOC v. Continental Oil




A second interpretation of section 706(f)(1) is represented by
the Third Circuit holding in EEOC v. North Hills Passavant
Hospital'"' which construed the statute to allow the EEOC to
bring suit, assuming conditions precedent are met, regardless of
the fact that the charging party has previously brought an action
on his charge. 0 3 The Third Circuit held that the EEOC's right of
action is not expressly terminated by the statute when an individ-
ual commences suit. It also found that there is no basis in the
legislative history of section 706(f)(1) to support such a view. °'0
The opposite conclusion was reached by the Eighth Circuit
in EEOC v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 0 1 which was followed by
the Tenth Circuit, on slightly different facts, in EEOC v. Duval
Corp. 106 The Missouri Pacific case held that when an individual
has brought suit on his charge the EEOC may not sue but rather
is limited to participation in the litigation through intervention
in the private suit.07 The Eighth Circuit relied upon the legisla-
tive history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII 08 indicating a
congressional concern for duplicative remedies, as manifested by
102 544 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1976).
1 0 Id. at 672.
104 Id. at 668 and 672.
05 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
528 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1976). Duval presented a fact situation which was the
converse of Continental Oil. In Duval the EEOC had filed suit first, and the issue was
whether the aggrieved party could file a separate lawsuit or was limited to intervention
in the EEOC action. The Tenth Circuit held that, after issuance of right-to-sue notice by
the EEOC, the EEOC shares with the aggrieved complainant a concurrent right to sue
during the 90-day statutory period. Id. at 948. The defendant's major argument in Duval
was that to allow both the EEOC and the aggrieved party to sue during the same 90-day
period would produce a multiplicity of suits. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated:
Congress was aware of this potential problem and provided a method to
avoid duplicitous actions. To protect the interests of both the EEOC and the
aggrieved party in a particular complaint, Congress established the right of
either party to apply for intervention in a suit filed by the other party.
Multiplicity of actions is prevented during the 90-day period [during which
the EEOC and the aggrieved party share a concurrent right to sue] because
when one of the parties sues, the other is limited to possible participation
only through intervention.
Id. at 948-49. The court further stated: "If, during the 90-day period in which the ag-
grieved party may also file an action, the EEOC is the first to file [as was the case in
Duval], the proper procedure under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) is to allow the aggrieved
party to intervene." Id. at 949.
1w 493 F.2d at 75.
t,0 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137-79.
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the inclusion of a provision for intervention by the EEOC or the
charging party into a suit previously filed by the other.09 The
reliance of the Missouri Pacific and Duval courts on this legisla-
tive history was criticized by the North Hills court, which as-
serted that the history cited by these courts did not refer to the
present language of section 706(f)(1) but to bills in a quite differ-
ent form which were not enacted into law."10 Perhaps as a result
of this criticism from the Third Circuit, the Tenth Circuit did not
rely on its Duval holding or on the legislative history of section
706(f)(1) in deciding the present case."' Nevertheless, it adopted
the Missouri Pacific-Duval view that the EEOC is limited to
intervention once the aggrieved complainant has already filed
suit. In so doing, the court stated that it placed "primary reliance
. . . on the construction of the language of the statute to avoid
surplusage.""' 2 It noted that "[s]ection 706(f)(1) provides that
the EEOC may be allowed to intervene in a previously filed pri-
vate lawsuit at the discretion of the trial court and upon certifica-
tion that the case is of general public importance.""' 3 It further
reasoned that under the holding of the North Hills case, this
1" 493 F.2d at 74-75, citing 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2148, where the
House committee reported that it
was concerned about the interrelationship between the newly created cease
and desist enforcement powers of the Commission and the existing right of
public action. It concluded that duplication of proceedings should be
avoided. The bill, therefore, contains a provision for termination of Commis-
sion jurisdiction once a private action has been filed (except for the power
of the Commission to intervene in the private actions).
110 544 F.2d at 668 & n.8. In a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the North Hills court persuasively supported this
conclusion by showing that the portion of the House committee report relied upon by the
Missouri Pacific and Duval courts related to the bill as it read prior to passage of an
amendment which substituted the EEOC's grant of cease and desist authority with the
authority to institute suits in federal trial court. Id. at 668-72. The Third Circuit pointed
out that the problems which may arise from duplicative administrative [i.e., cease-and-
desist proceedings] and judicial proceedings are entirely different from those which may
be created by the duplication of separate lawsuits. Id. at 670.
" The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "the most often quoted portions of legisla-
tive reports refer to the bill as originally proposed, granting cease and desist authority"
and that "[clertainly different considerations are involved indealing with conflicts be-
tween administrative and judicial proceedings, as opposed to potentially overlapping civil
litigation." 548 F.2d at 890 (footnote omitted). Refusing to admit any error in relying on
legislative history in Duval however, the Tenth Circuit concluded: "The best that can be
said of the legislative history on the point is that it is inconclusive." Id.
112 Id.
M' Id. at 889.
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provision is rendered superfluous, for if the EEOC is permitted
to duplicate a previously filed individual lawsuit, it can partici-
pate in the private suit with the permission of the trial court by
way of a motion to consolidate the suits, without regard to the
certification of the case as to general public importance." The
court concluded that the "statutory provision for intervention
must be read as the exclusive procedure by which the EEOC may
participate in a previously filed private lawsuit under § 706(f)(1)
in order to give it significance." Allowing a second suit to proceed
on the charge would emasculate the provision."15
In short, the Continental Oil case represents little more than
an affirmance of the Tenth Circuit's Duval holding. The court,
however, modified its rationale in order to answer the criticism
directed at Duval by the Third Circuit in the intervening North
Hills case.
III. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. Future Damages: Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372
(10th Cir. 1977)
In Steckler v. United States,"' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held, for the first time, that it was
proper to consider the effect of inflation upon future earnings.
The opinion resulted from a medical malpractice action brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act"7 against the Veterans Ad-
ministration Hospital in Denver."' The trial court awarded dam-
ages for permanent disability, present and future pain and suffer-
ing, and present and future lost earnings."' It refused, however,
to consider the influence of inflation upon future earnings. In-
stead, the trial court applied a discount factor to future earnings,
thus reflecting the present value of the amount awarded.2 0 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
and directed the trier of fact to consider the effect of inflation
upon future earnings. 2'
114 Id.
Id.
" 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1977).
"' 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (1977).
"' 549 F.2d at 1373.
"l Id.
Im Id. at 1375.
" Id. at 1378. Another interesting issue concerned whether the collateral source rule
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The Tenth Circuit noted that a majority of courts have dis-
counted future earnings to present value without considering the
effect of inflation upon future earnings. The majority's rationale,
and also that of the district court, emphasized the speculative
nature of considering anticipated inflation. 22 The Tenth Circuit
adopted the approach of the Ninth Circuit, stated in United
States v. English. 2 3 This method required, first, determining fu-
ture income by estimating future changes in purchasing power.
The estimate of future inflationary trends, however, must be sup-
ported by solid economic evidence. The final step of this ap-
proach discounted the estimated future income to its present
value. 121
applied to Social Security and Veterans Administration benefits. The Colorado Supreme
Court in Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 545, 481 P.2d 772, 774 (1971), said: "Simply
stated, it is that compensation or indemnity received by an injured party for a collateral
source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not contributed, will
not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer."
On the collateral source issue, the Tenth Circuit held that Veterans Administration
benefits were a noncollateral source. 549 F.2d at 1379 (citing United States v. Gray, 199
F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952)). However, the Social Security benefits attributable to employer
and employee contribution, as differentiated from government contribution, should be
regarded as a collateral source. 549 F.2d at 1379. The court stated:
There is a dearth of authority on whether Social Security disability
payments are to be regarded as income from a collateral source insofar as
they represent payments made by the injured person and his employer.
Logically they are collateral. We do know that the government has supple-
mented the fund from time to time where this has been necessary. The extent
to which the payments under Social Security disability can be traced to the
government is questionable. The part contributed by the worker and the
employers has the aspects of social insurance and as such is collateral to
monies contributed by the government. However, no authorities have been
presented to us on this issue and our research has failed to produce any case
dealing with the subject. It may be impossible to ascertain the part or per-
centage of funds attributable to the government which would be deductible
since the monies are commingled. Nevertheless, some effort to ascertain the
percentage or part contributed by the government should be made so as to
permit a determination of the contributions of the employer and employee
and their exclusion as collateral sources.
Since the cause is to be remanded, this subject ought to be considered.
The onus should be placed on the plaintiffs . ...
Id.
" 549 F.2d at 1376-77.
"' 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975). English was a wrongful death action brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
124 549 F.2d at 1378. For recent articles addressing this area see, e.g., Note, Inflation
and Future Loss of Earnings, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 281 (1975); Comment, Consideration of
Inflation in Calculating Lost Future Earnings-Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524
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The Tenth Circuit noted three other approaches. The first,
the offset method, rejected both the consideration of inflation and
the discounting of future earnings to present value. The second
approach ignored evidence of future inflationary trends because
of their speculative nature. The jury, however, would be permit-
ted to consider any diminution or increase in "purchasing
power." Thus, inflation is considered; its effect, however, cannot
be established through expert witnesses. The third method ap-
plied an inflation factor thereby reducing the discount factor.
12
B. Immunity: Jackson v. Kelley, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977)
In Jackson v. Kelley, 2 1 the Tenth Circuit refused to grant
absolute immunity through judicial decision to a former United
States Air Force physician. 2 7 Although the opinion was not
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 the Tenth Circuit
relied upon the discretionary-ministerial distinction, as applied
under the Act, to reach its decision.2 9 Jackson involved a medical
malpractice diversity action. The trial court had dismissed plain-
tiffs action, holding that an Air Force physician was a federal
official and thus immune from suit for actions arising within the
scope of his employment. 30 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court.
3'
The court believed that Doe v. McMillan 31 compelled the use
F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975), 72 CORNELL L. REv. 803 (1977); Note, Future Inflation, Prospective
Damages and the Circuit Courts, 62 VA. L. REv. 105 (1977); 17 S. TEx. L.J. (1976).
" 549 F.2d at 1377-78.
' 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977).
' Id. at 741. The Tenth Circuit recognized the contrary holding of Martinez v.
Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1339 (1977).
"2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
" The Tenth Circuit stated:
Generally speaking, a duty is discretionary if it involves judgment, planning,
or policy decisions. It is not discretionary if it involves enforcement or admin-
istration of a mandatory duty at the operational level, even if professional
expert evaluation is required . . . . The key is whether the duty is manda-
tory or whether the act complained of involved policy-making or judgment.
557 F.2d at 737-38.
* Id. at 736.
"' Id. at 741.
"= 412 U.S. 306 (1973). The Tenth Circuit stated:
Thus, the Court [in Doe] mandates the use of the discretionary function
test and a direct balancing of the policies underlying the immunity doctrine
in the context of each fact situation . . . . Mindful of these principles, the
first step here is to decide whether defendant's functions were discretionary.
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of the discretionary function test. For the first step of the test the
court determined whether the physician's functions were discre-
tionary. For guidance, it examined the discretionary-ministerial
distinction applied under the Federal Tort Claims Act.3 ' The key
to the distinction lies in whether the act involved a mandatory
duty or discretionary policymaking and judgment. To subject the
government to liability the act must be nondiscretionary.
In Jackson, the Tenth Circuit characterized the physician's
duty as nondiscretionary. It noted the presence of a ministerial
duty and the absence of a planning or policymaking function.
Furthermore, although the medical treatment required some
judgment and discretion, it did not necessitate governmental dis-
cretion. Immunization of official conduct required governmental
discretion. 34
For the second step the court balanced the harm to the pa-
tient with the threat to effective government. 35 The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that awarding monetary damages to an injured party
would not hinder effective government because neither politically
sensitive decisions nor discretionary governmental functions were
involved. 136
Finally, the court noted that its refusal to grant absolute
immunity was reinforced by a statute 7 enacted after this cause
of action arose. That statute affords indemnification or insurance
to military physicians assigned to foreign countries. The Tenth
Secondly, the consideration of harm to the individual citizen must be bal-
anced with the threat to effective government in the context of this case.
557 F.2d at 737.
" 557 F.2d at 737-38.
"3 Id. at 738-39. The Tenth Circuit cited with approval Henderson v. Bluemink, 511
F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Henderson, the court stated:
[T]he significant factor is that the discretion exercised might have been
medical rather than governmental. The chief policy underlying the creation
of immunity for lower governmental officials is mainly that which stems from
the desire to discourage "the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration
of policies of government." However, that policy is not applicable to the
exercise of normal medical discretion since doctors making such judgments
would face the same liability outside of government as they would face if the
complaint below is upheld.
Id. at 402-03.
"1 557 F.2d at 737.
"3 Id. at 739-40.
M7 Act of Oct. 8, 1976, § l(b), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1089(f) (West Supp. 1977).
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Circuit reasoned that, since a finding of liability must precede the
need for indemnity or insurance, the granting of absolute immun-
ity would render the statute superfluous. 8
C. Discretionary Function Exception: First National Bank v.
United States, 552 F.2d 370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 122
(1977)
First National Bank v. United States'39 involved one of the
tragic fact situations facing the Tenth Circuit in the past term.
Four children suffered permanent mental and physical impair-
ment resulting from organic mercury poisoning. 40 After the denial
of an administrative claim, petitioners brought suit under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.'4 ' The suit alleged negligence on the
part of the Pesticides Regulation Division of the Department of
Agriculture with regard to registration for interstate sale and ap-
proval for the labeling of the fungicide causing the poisoning."'
The district court held that the government was immune from
suit under the discretionary function exception." 3 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed.'"
The court focused on the regulations and statutory require-
l3 557 F.2d at 740-41.
IN 552 F.2d 370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 122 (1977).
"' The court stated:
[flt was determined that the Huckleby children were suffering from organic
mercury poisoning as a result of their eating the meat from the hog which
had been fed the grain treated with Panogen 15. Thus a "food-chain" poison-
ing was involved.
Alkyl mercury poisoning does irreversible damage to the central nervous
system. It affects sight, speech, locomotion and the ability to grasp objects
or otherwise use one's hands properly.
552 F.2d at 371 (footnotes omitted).
141 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
552 F.2d at 372.
Id. at 372. The discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), pro-
vides:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency of an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
552 F.2d at 374.
'" 552 F.2d at 377.
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ments of the Pesticide Regulation Division and noted that they
obligated the agency to engage in discretionary policy judgments
in evaluating the adequacy of labeling. The Tenth Circuit as-
serted that the pertinent statute and regulations provided only
generalized policy standards. It conceded that a scientific func-
tion was involved but since the function was not narrow in scope,
discretionary judgment predominated."' The court also decided
that the judgment whether to suspend or cancel registration fell




" Id. at 375-76. The Tenth Circuit stated: "[Tihe functions on which the negligence
claims are founded are within the words and reason of the exception. Evaluation of the
labeling did involve scientific as well as public policy considerations, but it was not
confined to a narrow scientific function .... " Id. at 376.
" The Tenth Circuit made two further holdings:
We note first that the decision-making as to possible suspension or cancella-
tion does implicate a policy choice based on substantive standards of product
safety . . . . Whether such discretion is exercised and possibly abused, or
whether there is a failure to exercise the discretion, such acts or omissions
related to the cancellation function are within the terms of the exception
provided by § 2680(a).
We feel the claims and proof relating to alleged failure to marshall and
submit data to the Secretary or to his surrogate, the Director of PRD, fall in
the same category. These actions are an integral part of the process for any
possible cancellation or suspension of a registration.
Id. at 377 (footnote omitted).
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